The Heap: How do use-after-free exploits work? - bin 0x16
Key Takeaways
This video teaches how to solve the heap2 challenge from exploit.education to learn about heap use-after-free exploits
Full Transcript
a very common issue that we still constantly encounter is shown in Heap level two of exploit exercise.com this is a classic use after free vulnerability let's try to understand the code first we have here a big while loop inside of Main in each round it prints the variable o which is a pointer to an object uh of this o struct up here and off has the attributes name which is a string up to 32 characters and an integer and the other variable that is printed is a sh pointer service which can point to a string in memory so both of these are addresses pointers then we read a line from standard input maximum 128 bytes so this is a secure fgets read no buffer overflow afterwards we have a couple of ifs that check if the input line is one of the following commands either o reset servers or loog in let's execute the program as well and then let's talk about each command when we first start the program both the O and the service pointer are null now we wait for input let's have a look at the O command when we type or it will allocate the size of or so that should be theoretically 32 by for the name plus 4 by for the integer then the whole allocated memory is overwritten with zeros this makes sense because if on the Heap data is constantly allocated and freed then a newly allocated area can have old data in there a free does not zero out the memory so here it zeros out on allocation afterwards the length of the input line is checked so it doesn't exceed the 32 bytes available in the or struct for the name and if that is safe the characters after the or command are copied the name of the O object let's try that let's authenticate as admin cool as you can see the variable o contains now an address this is where the O object is on the Heap now the last command is Log In which checks if the integer of the O object is not zero and if that's the case we successfully logged in otherwise if it's zero then it tells us to enter a password though in this case there is not much more functionality than that but just imagine that you are trying to log in as admin without knowing the password so somehow our goal is to set the integer to a value and then we are authenticated at the moment it seems impossible because the integer o is never set anywhere but we have learned from the beginning that there are bugs that allow us to modify variables another command here is reset which will free the O object on the Heap and this is actually where the issue is you notice when we reset the login process it frees the AR object but as you can see the O variable is not reset to zero it still contains the pointer into the Heap where the object object was before and when we for example log in now it will check the name attribute of that object well it hasn't changed so we are still un authenticated but the login command will use the variable or after we just freed it use after free get it now the last command here is service which will perform a Str strr dub a string duplication of the characters after the service command so for example we can specify that we want to use the hex service and now we also have an address in the service variable and strangely it's the same one as o that is weird so what does srdb do let's read the man page srdb returns a pointer to a new string which is a duplicate of the string s the memory of the new string is obtained with MOG and can be freed with free ah so it's just a convenient function that allocates the length of the string we passed to it and copies it there so it will also call Melo and does allocate stuff on the Heap and you can already guess why servers got the same address as o because o was freed there was free space and service got the free space there let's look at this in GDB first we set the assembl syntax to Intel and then we disassemble main let's first run it and use o ones so we performed at least one MOG then press contrl C and check the address of the Heap with infoproc mappings now we can print 20 words from the Heap with examine also because this application has still all the symbols and stuff inside of the binary GDB also knows that o is from the type struct O which we can print pretty again and we can see here the string name and the O integer we can do the same for the service string now let's create a breakpoint before the print F and with command we can then type what GDB commands shall be executed when we hit this breakpoint we can use Echo to print some strings to make it look more more pretty but first we want to print the Heap we Echo a line we want to print the off variable another line and the service variable at the end we continue automatically and finish the command sequence with end now let's rerun this binary okay at first we get some memory errors because the Heap doesn't exist yet so let's allocate our first value by authenticating with O as admin Also let's disable gdb's page Nation so we always print everything and don't get the type return to continue dialogue set pagination off now we can see here our Heap like we expected we have a junk with our string name admin but something is weird why is the length of the chunk only hex one Z that is only 8 bytes after you substract the 8 by chunk headers shouldn't it be like 32 byte name plus the integer what's going on well this is not that important for a solution but this is what happens if you write shitty code and name everything off the struct is called o the struct O pointer is called o the integer in here is called o and when the program calculated the size of O it calculat the size of the variable o not the struct O th it's only four byte but melog aligned into 8 bytes gosh people please name your variables better this is how backs and security issues are created anyhow Let's ignore that for now earlier we are wondering how the free works so let's free the O object with reset and pay attention to what changes okay L basically nothing changed except that the first word of the chunk data got replaced with zero that's because the first word in a free chunk is defined as a previous free chunk address because free chunks are in a link list but we don't have another free Chunk in the list does it's null so really not much happened other than the Malo algorithm knows that the free Heap starts again at the beginning and it doesn't care if there are still leftover values on the Heap it's as long as the metadata like the previous address pointer are correct thus it only changed that particular value anyhow we can now see that all objects still exist with the pointer into the Heap here but the name is now empty with nulls and the integer is still null but let's use servers to allocate a string on the Heap let's allocate just some recognizable characters like AAA no it only 3 a because the code is shitty and it also takes a space before the ace here in a heap we can see see that the string got allocated and we see that the name of the O object has now some different values now let's allocate the new string with service bbbb and another one with CCC we see the Heap slowly filling up and huh what's that suddenly the O integer has a huge value that's because it points into the Heap where the CCC is stored and if we now log in then we get the message that we are already logged in awesome I have to say this level is so horribly broken as I mentioned before the code is so shitty that it allocates the wrong size for the Earth object the space is too small I show you let's restart it and Au again as admin now simply enter a long service string and boom we also over rote the integer and we get the loged in message so we didn't have to free the O object with reset to solve it but I wanted to introduce the term use after free and it was also kind of the of challenge [Music] [Applause] [Music]
Original Description
Solving heap2 from exploit.education to learn about heap use-after-free (UAF) exploits
heap2: https://exploit.education/protostar/heap-two/
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