Lecture 23: Bargaining with Incomplete Information

MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025 Instructor: Ian Ball View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-economic-applications-of-game-theory-fall-2025/ YouTube Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUl4u3cNGP63quuKvMHCt3cmTmt0O2qpv In this lecture, Ian Ball explains bargaining with incomplete information, which is a scenario where at least one party lacks full knowledge of the other's private information. Plea bargains are an example of this. License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA More information at https://ocw.mit.edu/terms More courses at https://ocw.mit.edu Support OCW at http://ow.ly/a1If50zVRlQ We encourage constructive comments and discussion on OCW’s YouTube and other social media channels. Personal attacks, hate speech, trolling, and inappropriate comments are not allowed and may be removed. More details at https://ocw.mit.edu/comments.