Lecture 21: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Key Takeaways
Introduces perfect Bayesian equilibrium using an example of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction
Original Description
MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025
Instructor: Ian Ball
View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-economic-applications-of-game-theory-fall-2025/
YouTube Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUl4u3cNGP63quuKvMHCt3cmTmt0O2qpv
Ian Ball begins the lecture by sharing an example of a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction. He then continues by introducing dynamic Bayesian games.
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